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Abstract
“Wisdom of crowds” refers to the phenomenon that the average opinion of a group of
individuals on a given question can be very close to the true answer. It requires a large group
diversity of opinions, but the collective error, the difference between the average opinion and
the true value, has to be small. We consider a stochastic opinion dynamics where individuals
can change their opinion based on the opinions of others (social influence α), but to some
degree also stick to their initial opinion (individual conviction β). We then derive analytic
expressions for the dynamics of the collective error and the group diversity. We analyze their
long-term behavior to determine the impact of the two parameters (α,β) and the initial
opinion distribution on the wisdom of crowds. This allows us to quantify the ambiguous role
of social influence: only if the initial collective error is large, it helps to improve the wisdom
of crowds, but in most cases it deteriorates the outcome. In these cases, individual conviction
still improves the wisdom of crowds because it mitigates the impact of social influence.
Keywords: opinion dynamics, opinion distribution, collective effects, group decisions
1 Introduction
The idea to establish social science in the spirit of mathematics and physics dates back to the
first half of the 19th century, when Auguste Compte (1798-1854) launched sociology based on
the belief that the society follows general laws very much like the physical world. At about the
same time Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874) published his "Essays on Social Physics" (1835), where
he applied probability theory to data from humans. Later developments in sociophysics [30] tried
to adhere to these two approaches: derive a general dynamics applicable to societies, and analyze
social data to find universal laws. Our paper aligns to these developments.
We do not enter the controversial discussion to what extent sociophysics has really contributed to
the understanding of social systems. But a few conceptual frameworks from physics have indeed
inspired the discussion about how to formalize social dynamics. At the heart of statistical physics,
as proposed in the late 19th century based on the fundamental works by Ludwig Boltzmann
(1844-1906) and J. Williard Gibbs (1839-1903), is the problem of how the microscopic dynamics
of system elements is linked to the dynamics of macroscopic system variables. This question
is of paramount importance also for the description of social and of economic systems. For
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instance, how do the opinions of individuals contribute to the public opinion? How do decisions
by individual consumers influence the market dynamics?
To answer such questions requires to solve a number of problems. Ideally one wishes to have a
theory that derives, from the proposed or observed dynamics of system elements (often termed
as agents), the macroscopic dynamics. This works impressively well for some physical systems,
but depends on a number of restrictive assumptions for socio-economic systems. Nevertheless,
the formalization of agent-based models, done in the right manner, is able to provide the micro-
macro link also for such systems, as for example the framework of Brownian agents witnesses
[29].
The second problem regards the identification of appropriate macroscopic variables that capture
the relevant system dynamics. Different aggregated measures can be proposed for socio-economic
systems. But do they really give insight into the conditions that determine the system dynamics?
Do they well reflect dependencies between individuals on the micro level? Can they be linked to
experiments or to empirical data?
In our paper, we discuss these problems for a specific application scenario, commonly denoted
as the wisdom of crowds (WoC) [11, 26, 32]. In its simplest form, it describes a purely statistical
effect. If we take a large number of independent individual opinions on a certain question, the
average over these opinions is surprisingly close to the true answer to that question. In particular,
this average is closer to the truth than most individual and even expert opinions. This finding
was already reported by Francis Galton (1822-1911), who asked visitors at a life-stock fair about
the weight of a particular ox [6]. Ever since, ample evidence for the WoC effect was provided for
very different scenarios, such as guessing tasks [21], problem-solving experiments [18, 33], online
communities [7, 15], or prediction markets [28].
At the same time there is evidence that the collective opinion of a group of individuals can be
remarkably wrong with respect to an objective truth. One reason for this comes from the fact
that individual opinions are hardly independent. Instead, there are, often subtle, social influences
that bias individual opinions. In fact, it was shown that complex mechanisms of social contagion
change not only the speed of opinion change, but also its outcome [3, 14, 31]. On the systemic
level, this can lead to improvements for the wisdom of crowds, e.g. in case of social networks [1].
But more often, social influence in decision processes results into situations where, over time, the
collective opinion moves farther and farther away from an objective truth, while all individuals
are more and more convinced that they collectively move towards the right solution. The wrong
outcomes of such collective opinion dynamics can lead to disastrous situations as reported for
financial bubbles and stock market crashes [4, 20], panic stampedes [13], the evaluation of the
probability of an accident in NASA’s shuttles [5], or the famous Stanford prison experiment [9].
It seems that the wisdom of crowds and the madness of crowds [12, 19, 24] are two faces of the
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same coin. This fuels the long-standing discussion under which conditions the wisdom of experts
would outperform the wisdom of crowds [2, 8, 25].
In this paper, we aim at deriving formal expressions for the systemic measures that are able
to capture the effect of social influence on the WoC effect. These measures, as proposed in the
literature [17, 26], are the collective error, measuring how close the average opinion is to the true
value, and the group diversity, measuring the variance of individual opinions. For the wisdom of
crowds, it is required that the group diversity is large, while the collective error is small. But it
is to expect that, in the presence of social influence, the group diversity reduces drastically. This
bears the risk that individual opinions converge to a common opinion that is far way from the
true value. But there may be conditions under which social influence may help to converge to an
opinion closer to the truth.
With our investigations, we want to better understand the ambiguous role of social influence. Our
approach is motivated by (i) published experimental findings [17, 27] and (ii) their analysis by
means of an agent-based model [22, 23]. The novel contribution of this paper is in the derivation
of analytical expressions for the macroscopic quantities that shall describe the WoC effect.
So far, agent-based simulations have been used to obtain insights into the evolution of these
quantities. But the challenge to analytically solve the problem has not been tackled yet, also
because it requires a lot of effort and some patience, as we demonstrate in this paper. Simulation
results are usually quicker and more handy, but provide less insights into how the macroscopic
indicators for the WoC effect are composed, and what they depend on. Eventually, one wishes
to quantify the range of parameters of the opinion dynamics that may lead to an enhancement
or a deterioration of the WoC effect.
2 Quantifying the wisdom of crowds
2.1 Measures for the wisdom of crowds
Opinion distribution. Let us consider an experimental situation, where subjects had, for
instance, to estimate the length of the border of Switzerland, which is a non-zero, positive and
possibly large value [17]. Each of these subjects returns an individual estimate, xi, which we call
an opinion in the following. The values of xi are strictly positive and very broadly distributed.
As the mentioned experiments have shown, the expected distribution of opinions, P (x), is right-
skewed and can be proxied by a log-normal distribution. This means that the logarithms of xi
follow a normal distribution lnxi ∼ N (µlnx, σ2lnx) with mean µlnx and variance Var[lnx] = σ2lnx.
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Because the underlying distribution is very broad, the average opinion is not well represented
by the arithmetic mean
µx = ⟨x⟩ =∑Ni=1 xi (1)
because it is much larger than most opinion values. Instead, the geometric mean is the appropriate
aggregation measure for the average opinion:
µgeo = {∏Ni=1 xi}1/N ⇒ µlnx = lnµgeo =∑Ni=1 lnxi = ⟨lnx⟩ (2)
In the following, we consider that subjects can change their opinion over time either because
of random influences or in response to information received from other subjects. The details of
these influences are specified in the following section. But from now on, all quantities become
time-dependent, i.e. opinions become xi(t). While their initial values xi(0) follow a log-normal
distribution, the same does not hold for times t > 0, because of the assumed influences on the
change of opinions.
The wisdom of crowds is expected to work if the diversity of individual opinions is large, while
the deviation of the average opinion from the true value T is small. Therefore, in line with
previous studies [17], we will use the group diversity, D(t), and the collective error, E(t), as
macroscopic measures to evaluate these conditions. We are particularly interested in the time-
dependent change and the stationary values of these measures, as they can indicate under which
conditions the wisdom of crowds will break down. To analyze these conditions is the aim of our
paper.
Collective error. E(t) shall be defined as the squared deviation of the average opinion from
the true value, T : E(t) = [lnT − ⟨lnx(t)⟩]2 , (3)
For the dynamics follows:
d
dt
E(t) = −2 [lnT − ⟨lnx(t)⟩] d
dt
⟨lnx(t)⟩ (4)
Group diversity. We express D(t) by the variance of the opinion distribution:
D(t) = Var [lnx(t)] = 1
N
N∑
i=1 [lnxi(t) − ⟨lnx(t)⟩]2 = ⟨[lnx(t)]2⟩ − ⟨lnx(t)⟩2 (5)
In order to derive a dynamic equation for the group diversity we use the delta method to ap-
proximate the variance. This method is in essence a first-order Taylor expansion of the form:
Var [f(X)] ≈ [f ′ (⟨X⟩)]2Var[X] (6)
4/22
P. Mavrodiev, F. Schweitzer:
The ambiguous role of social influence on the wisdom of crowds:
An analytic approach
Submitted for publication
The method will be a poor approximation in cases where f(X) is highly non-linear. This is not
the case when f(X) = lnX. For the calculation we write
xi(t) = ⟨x(t)⟩ + δi(t) (7)
where δi(t) is an individual’s deviation from the average opinion, with ⟨δ(t)⟩ = 0. With this
notation and Eqn. (6), the group diversity becomes:
D(t) = 1⟨x(t)⟩2 ⟨δ2(t)⟩ (8)
This compact expression allows us to derive the dynamics in the form:
d
dt
D(t) = 1⟨x(t)⟩2 ddt ⟨δ2(t)⟩ − 2⟨x(t)⟩4 ⟨δ2(t)⟩ ⟨x(t)⟩ ddt ⟨x(t)⟩ (9)
2.2 Opinion dynamics
To formalize how the opinion xi(t) of each subject changes over time, we build on the framework
of Brownian agents [29], which considers a superposition of deterministic and stochastic influences
on the dynamics:
dxi(t)
dt
= −β [xi(t) − xi(0)] + 1
N
∑
j
Fij(t) +Aξi(t) (10)
xi(0) denotes the initial value. The parameter β describes the individual conviction about the
own opinion. The larger β, the more an agent tries to stick to the initial opinion. ξi(t) is Gaussian
white noise, i.e. it is not correlated in time, ⟨ξi(t)ξi(t′)⟩ = δ(t−t′), and zero on average, ⟨ξi(t) = 0⟩.
A denotes the strength of the stochastic force. The term Fij(t) eventually describes how the
change of opinion of agent i is influenced by the opinion of other agents j. Here, we assume that
agents have information only about the average opinion of all other agents, which is equivalent
to a mean-field scenario. This is reflected in the following assumption for Fij(t):
Fij(t) = α [xj(t) − xi(t)] (11)
The parameter α describes the strength of the social influence of other opinions xj(t) on the
opinion xi(t). In our ansatz the social influence from other opinions increases with the difference
between opinions. While this sounds like a simplified assumption, it has been empirically justified
in [23], therefore we use it here. Because the coupling variable α is effectively a constant, equal
for all i, we have:
1
N
N∑
j=1Fij(t) = α [⟨x(t)⟩ − xi(t)] ; ⟨x(t)⟩ = 1N
N∑
j=1xj(t) (12)
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where ⟨x(t)⟩ is denoted as the mean opinion in the following. Eqn. (10) therefore results in the
stochastic dynamics:
dxi(t)
dt
= α [⟨x(t)⟩ − xi(t)] + β [xi(0) − xi(t)] +Aξi(t) (13)
Averaging the dynamics of Eq. (13) over the whole agent population yields a simple linear form:
d ⟨x(t)⟩
dt
= β [⟨x(0)⟩ − ⟨x(t)⟩] + A√
N
⟨ξ(t)⟩ (14)
which is a standard Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with the solution:
⟨x(t)⟩ = ⟨x(0)⟩ e−βt + ⟨x(0)⟩ (1 − e−βt) + A√
N
∫ t
0
eβ(s−t) ⟨ξ(s)⟩ds (15)
Therefore the time average of the ensemble average of the opinons, ⟨x(t)⟩, equals ⟨x(0)⟩ for large
t.
Initial configuration. In order to solve our dynamic equations for the macroscopic measuresD(t) and E(t), we still need to specify the initial distribution of opinions. We take the log-normal
distribution P (x,0) with the parameters µlnx(0) and σ2lnx(0) as an input, from which N values
xi(0) are sampled. Each of these initial values can be represented as xi(0) = ⟨x(0)⟩ + δi(0),
Eqn. (7), where δi(0) is the deviation of the initial opinion from the initial mean ⟨x(0)⟩. By
definition ⟨δ(0)⟩ = 0. We note that only the δi(0) result from the log-normal distribution, while
in Eqn. (7) the xi(t) and δi(t) are determined by Eqn. (13).
The initial collective error E(0) and the initial average opinion are related by Eqn. (3):
µlnx(0) = ⟨lnx(0)⟩ = lnT ±√E(0) (16)
Hence, we only need an additional value σ2lnx(0), to calculate the initial group diversity D(0).
Then, the initial configuration on the macroscopic level is given by the pair {E(0),D(0)}. It will
be of interest to us to study the dynamics of these values, in particular their long-term values
for t→∞, {ELT,DLT}.
With these specifications of the systemic measures and the agent variables, we now proceed
solving the dynamics analytically.
3 Analytical results
3.1 Collective error
Dynamic solution. To calculate E(t), Eqn. (3) and dE(t)/dt, Eqn. (4), we need to have
the explicit expressions for the following quantities: ⟨lnx(t)⟩, d ⟨lnx(t)⟩ /dt. These are derived in
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Appendices E and F. Here we only present the results:
d ⟨lnx(t)⟩
dt
=(α + β) [1 − β
β + αe−(α+β)t ] ∞∑n=1 (−1)
n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n [β + αe−(α+β)t]n
+ A√
N
⟨ξ(t)⟩⟨x(0)⟩ (17)
Integration leads to the solution:
⟨lnx(t)⟩ = ⟨lnx(0)⟩ + ∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n αn ⟨δn(0)⟩n(α + β)n [1 − e−(α+β)nt]+ (18)
+ ∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n n−1∑k=1 1k(n − 1k − 1) βn−kαk [1 − e−(α+β)kt]
With these expressions we have completely described the dynamics of the collective error.
Asymptotic solution. The long term behavior of the collective error results from t → ∞,
and we find
ELT = [lnT − ⟨lnx(0)⟩ − ∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n αn ⟨δn(0)⟩n(α + β)n (19)
− ∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n n−1∑k=1 1k(n − 1k − 1) βn−kαk]
2
As we see, the final outcome of the collective error is mainly determined by the properties of
the initial opinion distribution, in particular ⟨x(0)⟩ and ⟨δ(0)⟩, and further by the two model
parameters social influence α and individual conviction β. We will discuss the consequences of
this in the next Section.
3.2 Group diversity
Dynamic solution. To calculate D(t), Eqn. (8), and dD(t)/dt, Eqn. (9), we need to have
the explicit expressions for ⟨x(t)⟩ and ⟨δ2(t)⟩ as well as their time derivatives. Again, here we
only present the result, the derivation is provided in Appendix D. Plugging in ⟨δ2(t)⟩ from Eq.
47 into D(t), Eqn. (8), yields:
D(t) = ⟨δ2(0)⟩[⟨x(t)⟩ (α + β)]2 [β + αe−(α+β)t]2 (20)
which is always positive.
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Asymptotic solution. The long term behavior of the group diversity results from t → ∞,
and we find
DLT = ⟨δ2(0)⟩β2[⟨x(0)⟩ (α + β)]2 (21)
where we made use of the fact that ⟨x(t)⟩ ≈ ⟨x(0)⟩, see Eqn. (15).
We can further derive how the long-term group diversity depends on the two model parameters,
social influence α and individual conviction β:
d
dα
DLT = − 2 ⟨δ2(0)⟩β2⟨x(0)⟩2 (α + β)3 < 0 ; ddβDLT = 2αβ ⟨δ
2(0)⟩⟨x(0)⟩2 (α + β)3 > 0 (22)
This will be tested in the next section. Further, we see that the final group diversity increases
with the initial deviation from the mean, ⟨δ2(0)⟩:
d
d ⟨δ2(0)⟩DLT = β2⟨x(0)⟩2 (α + β)2 > 0 (23)
4 Discussion
4.1 Collective error
We now use our analytical solutions from the previous section to study the dependence of the
collective error and the group diversity on the two model parameters, social influence α and
individual conviction β, and on the variance of the initial opinion distribution.
The collective error E(t) is defined as the squared difference between the true value, lnT , and the
mean opinion, ⟨lnx(t)⟩. Hence, the plot gives a parabola with the minimum at lnT = ⟨lnx(t)⟩.
The asymptotic value ⟨lnxLT⟩ is calculated from Eqn. (18). Figure 1 illustrates how ⟨lnxLT⟩ and
consequently ELT, Eqn. (19), depend on the two parameters (α,β) (a) and on the initial variance⟨δ2(0)⟩ (b).
Comparing the sets of parameters (0.01,0.1) and (0.1,0.1) we see that for smaller social influence
α the motion of ⟨lnx(t)⟩ is slower and the quasi-stationary state of ⟨lnx⟩ is respectively closer
to the initial value (Figure 1(a), dotted vs. dotted-dashed line). On the other hand, comparing
the sets of parameters (0.1,0.1) and (0.1,0.6) we see that for smaller individual conviction β the
motion of ⟨lnx(t)⟩ is larger and the quasi-stationary state of ⟨lnx⟩ is respectively further away
from the initial value (Figure 1(a), dotted-dashed vs. long-dashed line).
Obviously, a larger individual conviction β counteracts the effect of a larger social influence
α, which ultimately results in the smallest collective error. That means, we observe a struggle
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Figure 1: Collective error E dependent on ⟨lnx⟩. True value: lnT = −2.83 (solid black line). Initial
condition: ⟨lnx(0)⟩ = −3 (dashed black line), E(0) = 0.02, ⟨x(0)⟩ = 0.075.
(a) ⟨δ2(0)⟩ = 0.006. Stationary states for different parameters (α,β): (0.01, 0.1) (dotted line),
(0.1, 0.1) (dotted-dashed line), (0.1, 0.6) (long-dashed line).
(b) (α,β) = (0.1,0.1). Stationary states for different initial variances ⟨δ2(0)⟩: 0.004 (dashed
line), 0.01 (dotted-dashed line).
between social influence α and individual conviction β. A larger α expands the range of motion
of ⟨lnx(t)⟩, consequently increases the convergence limit, whereas a larger β restricts it. These
opposing effects may lead to a reduction of long-term E , as in Figure 1(a). But, as we will
demonstrate in Figure 3 in the next Section, conditional on the initial conditions E(0) and D(0),
these two opposing effects may also lead to a deterioration.
The effect of the initial variance, ⟨δ2(0)⟩, on the long-term collective error is similar to the
influence of α. A larger heterogeneity in the initial opinions which directly translates to larger
initial group diversity, leads to longer motion of ⟨lnx(t)⟩ (Figure 1(b), dotted vs. dotted-dashed
lines) and consequently to a higher ⟨lnxLT⟩. In line with the above argumentation, whether this
has a positive or a negative net effect on the collective error depends entirely on the initial
distribution of opinions and is further discussed in Section 4.3.
In conclusion, for given parameters (α,β) the initial condition ⟨lnx(0)⟩ uniquely determines the
end value of the collective error. It should be noted that the log of the geometric mean exhibits
only rightward motion, since d⟨lnx(t)⟩/dt > 0, Eqn. (17). Hence, if we start from ⟨lnx(0)⟩ > ln(T )
the collective error will always increase.
4.2 Group diversity
The dependency of the group diversity D(t) on the parameters (α,β) and the initial variance⟨δ2(0)⟩ resembles that of the collective error (within the parameter space in which it is well
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defined). Figure 2(a) shows the effect of the social influence α and the individual conviction β.
As expected from the analytical solution in Eqn. (22), the increase of social influence leads to a
gradual decrease of the group diversity towards the steady state given by Eqn. (21), whereas the
increase of individual conviction leads to an increase in group diversity.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the group diversity D(t) over time.
(a) ⟨δ2(0)⟩ = 0.006, D(0) = 0.8, ⟨x(0)⟩ = 0.075. Different parameters (α,β): (0.5, 2.0) (solid line),
(0.8, 2.0) (dotted line), (0.8, 2.5) (dashed line).
(b) (α,β) = (0.8,0.2), ⟨x(0)⟩ = 0.075. Different initial variances ⟨δ2(0)⟩: 0.006 (dotted line),
0.004 (solid line).
Figure 2(b) illustrates that an increase of the initial variance slightly increases also the group
diversity. However, because of the social influences, the impact of the initial variance becomes
smaller over time.
4.3 Exploring the parameter space
To complement the discussion of the specific cases above and to reveal a more profound insight
on the impact of social influence and individual conviction, we run a parameter sweep on (α,β).
In Figure 3 we have calculated the long-term collective error ELT, Eqn. (19), for three different
initial values of the collective error which are chosen such that they represent three characteristic
scenarios. The color code indicates the value of ELT, (blue) for low values, which is positive,
(red) for high values, which is negative. We note that for each plot, the color code represents
different values, and (blue) not always means ELT = 0. Each plot also indicates with a black line
those parameter combinations (α,β) for which ELT = E(0). Except for Figure 3(c), these lines
are barely noticeable because they coincide with α = 0.
We remind that the average opinion can only increase, since d⟨lnx(t)⟩/dt > 0, Eqn. (17). This
was described as a rightward motion of ⟨lnx(t)⟩ in Figure 1. So, can we reach a situation where
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Figure 3: Color-coded long-term collective error ELT dependent on the values of social influence
α (x-axis) and individual conviction β (y-axis). Different initial conditions:
(a) E(0)=0.80, lnT =-2.00, ⟨lnx(0)⟩=-2.9,
(b) E(0)=0.02, lnT =-3.12, ⟨lnx(0)⟩=-3.0,
(c) E(0)=0.01, lnT =-2.90, ⟨lnx(0)⟩=-3.0.
Black contour lines indicate regions in the parameter space where ELT = E(0). Note that these
are vertical lines at α=0 in all plots, in (c) there is an additional line.
ELT = 0? This depends solely on the initial condition, ⟨lnx(0)⟩. Figure 3(a,c) depict initial
configurations where ⟨lnx(0)⟩ < ln(T ). Thus, according to the plot in Figure 1, there is a chance
that ELT = 0, i.e. a convergence of the collective opinions to the true value. This is not the case
for Figure 3(b), where the initial configuration is ⟨lnx(0)⟩ > ln(T ).
Nevertheless, in all situations there are parameter sets (α,β) that minimize the collective error,ELT. Thus, we are interested to know whether this minimum value increases or decreases if we
vary α or β. Figure 3(a) illustrates a situation where we have initially a large collective error,E(0) = 0.8. Because of this, an increase in social influence, α, always improves the collective
error. But an increase in individual conviction β makes this worse, because it reinforces the
initial situation, which was bad. For α = 0.4, for instance, we see with increasing β a color change
from (green) to (red).
The situation is different in Figure 3(c), which as a similar initial configuration, but a very small
initial collective error, E(0) = 0.01. Because of this, a large increase in social influence, α > 0.5,
will lead to a deterioration. This can be counterbalanced by an increase of individual conviction
β. Taken e.g. at α = 0.8, an increase of β leads to a considerable improvement with respect to
the collective error.
At difference with the two other configurations (a) and (b), in Figure 3(c) we see a non-
monotonous dependency of the collective error on the parameters (α,β). Even that the initial
collective error was very small, there are large parameter ranges where ELT < E(0) (deep blue).
The collective error can also reach the minimum ELT = 0. Obviously, those parameter ranges
optimize the wisdom of crowds. We note that that this is the case for a non-zero, but not too
large social influence, α < 0.5.
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Figure 3(b), despite the different initial condition ⟨lnx(0)⟩ > lnT , resembles more the dependency
of Figure 3(c) than of Figure 3(a), because the initial collective error is also small, E(0) = 0.02.
But here we do not find a non-monotonous dependency of the collective error; instead it always
increases. In this situation, any social influence α will only deteriorate the outcome, in particular
if it becomes large. This can be counterbalanced by an increasing individual conviction β.
From this discussion we have to conclude that there is no simple monotonous impact of α or
β on the collective error. It is very important how far the initial average opinion is away from
the truth, and it is as important if it is below or above the true value. Given that, there are
parameter ranges, where an increasing social influence can also improve the collective error. But
this impact cannot be decoupled from the influence of the individual conviction, which reinforces
a good or a bad initial opinion distribution.
0.0 0.4 0.82
.0
3.
0
4.
0
5.
0
Social Influence
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Figure 4: Color-coded long-term group diversity DLT dependent on the values of social influ-
ence α (x-axis) and individual conviction β (y-axis). Initial condition: D(0)=0.72.
In Figure 4 we have plotted how the long-term group diversity depends on the parameters (α,β)
for the three cases shown in Figure 3. We note that DLT behaves the same for all three cases,
as it depends only on α, β and ⟨δ2(0)⟩, which are invariant across the three starting states.
We recall that the wisdom of crowds depend on a large group diversity, thus (red) indicates
the better and (blue) the worse outcomes. As it can be expected from the discussion above, a
larger social influence α always negatively impacts the group diversity, regardless of the starting
configuration. Individual conviction β acts in the opposite way - it maintains diversity in the
group by increasing the reluctance against a change of opinions.
5 Conclusion
The wisdom of crowds is an intriguing phenomenon. The observation that the average of diverse
opinions about a given questions is often more accurate than any single estimate is counter
intuitive at first sight. But numerous anectodal, empirical and theoretical investigations across
a variety of settings support this finding [10, 16, 28, 32].
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However, the wisdom of crowds depends on a crucial assumption that is hard to maintain under
real circumstances, namely the indepencence of opinions. Quite often, external events, random
occurrences or social influences from others lead to a change of individual opinions that also
impact the wisdom of crowds.
The aim of our paper was to study this impact of social influence in more detail. We utilize a
opinion dynamics model proposed before [22] that considers three different ingredients: (i) the
individual conviction β to keep the initial opinion xi(0) despite other influences, (ii) the social
influence α to change the own opinion xi(t) if information about the average opinion ⟨x(t)⟩
becomes available, and (iii) small random influences Aξi(t).
Instead of running agent-based simulations, we aimed at deriving analytic expressions for the
two most important systemic quantities that describe the wisdom of crowds effect: the collective
error E(t) and the group diversity D(t). Our only input, in addition to the opinion dynamics
model, Eqn. (13), are assumptions about the initial opinion distribution, which allows us to de-
rive expressions for the average initial opinion ⟨lnx(0)⟩ and the average initial variance ⟨δ2(0)⟩.
A quite cumbersome derivation allowed us to find closed-form expressions for the long-term col-
lective error ELT, Eqn. (19), and the long-term group diversity DLT, Eqn. (21). These expressions
could then be calculated numerically to analyze the impact of the two parameters (α,β) and the
initial conditions, E(0), D(0), which have been derived from ⟨lnx(0)⟩ and ⟨δ2(0)⟩.
Our systematic evaluation of the impact of the parameters and the initial conditions reveals the
ambiguous role of social influence α on the wisdom of crowds. We could identify scenarios where
increasing the social influence indeed improves the wisdom of crowds: if the initial collective error
is high, but the initial average opinion is below the true value. But we could also demonstrate
that an increasing social influence deteriorates the wisdom of crowds, if the initial collective error
is already low.
This behavior is mitigated by the influence of the individual conviction β, which always rein-
forces the impact of the initial opinion. In those cases, where the initial collective error is large,
i.e. the starting configuration of opinions is rather bad, a large individual conviction does not
improve the outcome. But in those cases, where the initial collective error is already small, a
large individual conviction helps to counterbalance the impact of social influence, and thus leads
to better outcomes.
In particular, we could identify scenarios where the collective error vanishes, i.e. the average
opinion converges to the true value. This is the case if the initial collective error is low, the initial
average opinion is below the true value and the social influence is at low to moderate values.
The generality of our results of course depend on the assumptions about the opinion dynamics. It
may seem that a coupling of the individual opinion to the average opinion is not the most realistic
scenario. But this beguiles. Analyzing experimental data, it was shown that this dynamics indeed
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captures the opinion dynamics of subjects in these experiments [23]. So, there is evidence for our
proposed dynamics.
One could wish to generalize the derivations provided in this paper to more complex opinion
dynamics that do not assume couplings to the mean. However, we were unable to find analytic
expressions for the relevant measures, collective error and group diversity, for more complex cases.
Nevertheless, the analysis provided in this paper allows us to understand and to quantify the
impact of social influence on the wisdom of crowds, without the need for agent-based computer
simulations. As we have demonstrated, social influence is not inherently “good” or “bad”, per
se. It depends particularly on the initial opinion distribution, i.e. the prior knowledge of the
individuals, whether social influence can improve the wisdom of crowds.
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Appendix
A Derivation of ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩
Before we can calculate our quantities of interest, we have to derive expressions for some terms involving
δ(0) and δ(t) to be used later. We remind that these δ, according to Eqn. (7), describe deviations from
the mean at different times. δ(0) is the initial deviation and follows the log-normal distribution. δ(t),
however, depends on the dynamics of x(t), Eqn. (13).
Keeping in mind that the ensemble average and the differential are linear operators and thus interchange-
able:
d ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩
dt
= ⟨dδ(0)δ(t)
dt
⟩ = ⟨dδ(t)
dt
δ(0) + δ(t)dδ(0)
dt
⟩ (24)
The terms dδi(0)/dt = 0 since all δi(0) are constants. Hence:
d ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩
dt
= ⟨dδ(t)
dt
δ(0)⟩ = ⟨d(x(t) − ⟨x(t)⟩)
dt
δ(0)⟩ = ⟨dx(t)
dt
δ(0)⟩ − ⟨d ⟨x(t)⟩
dt
δ(0)⟩ =
= ⟨dx(t)
dt
δ(0)⟩ − d ⟨x(t)⟩
dt
⟨δ(0)⟩´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=0 = ⟨
dx(t)
dt
δ(0)⟩ (25)
Now we can plug in x(t) from Eqn. (13):
d ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩
dt
= ⟨δ(0)α(⟨x(t)⟩ − x(t)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=−δ(t) ) + δ(0)β(x(0) − x(t)) +Aξ(t)δ(0)⟩= − α ⟨δ(t)δ(0)⟩ + β ⟨δ(0)(⟨x(0)⟩ + δ(0))⟩ − β ⟨δ(0)(⟨x(t)⟩ + δ(t))⟩+
+ A√
N
⟨ξ(t)δ(0)⟩
= − α ⟨δ(t)δ(0)⟩ + β ⟨δ2(0)⟩ − β ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩ + A√
N
⟨ξ(t)δ(0)⟩´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=⟨ξ(t)⟩⟨δ(0)⟩=0=β ⟨δ2(0)⟩ − (α + β) ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩ (26)
where we have used the fact that ξi(t) and δi(0) have negligible covariance. This is true because generation
of the δi does not depend on the white noise, nor does the ξi’s depend on the initial distribution of δi.
The solution of the above equation is:
⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩ = β ⟨δ2(0)⟩
α + β +Ce−(α+β)t (27)
The constant C is given by the initial condition ⟨δ(0)δ(0)⟩:
C = ⟨δ(0)δ(0)⟩ − β ⟨δ2(0)⟩
α + β (28)
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However, ⟨δ(0)δ(0)⟩ = ⟨δ2(0)⟩, hence:
C = α
α + β ⟨δ2(0)⟩ (29)
Therefore:
⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩ = β ⟨δ2(0)⟩
α + β + αα + β ⟨δ2(0)⟩ e−(α+β)t (30)
B Derivation of ⟨δ(0)δ2(t)⟩
We use again the fact that the ensemble average and the differential are interchangeable:
d ⟨δ(0)δ2(t)⟩
dt
= ⟨dδ(0)δ2(t)
dt
⟩ = ⟨δ(0)dδ2(t)
dt
+ δ2(t)dδ(0)
dt
⟩ (31)
The δ(0) are constant, hence dδ(0)/dt = 0:
d ⟨δ(0)δ2(t)⟩
dt
= 2 ⟨δ(0)δ(t)dδ(t)
dt
⟩ = 2 ⟨δ(0)δ(t) d
dt
(x(t) − ⟨x(t)⟩)⟩
= 2⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ ⟨δ(0)δ(t) ddtx(t)⟩ − ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩ ddt ⟨x(t)⟩
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (32)
Plugging in x(t) from Eq. 13 yields:
d ⟨δ(0)δ2(t)⟩
dt
= 2⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ ⟨δ(0)δ(t)[α(⟨x(t)⟩ − x(t)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=−δ(t) ) + β(x(0) − x(t)) +Aξ(t)]⟩ − ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩
d
dt
⟨x(t)⟩ ⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦= −2α ⟨δ(0)δ2(t)⟩ + 2β ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩ ( ⟨x(0)⟩ − ⟨x(t)⟩ ) + 2β ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩ (33)
− 2β ⟨δ(0)δ2(t)⟩ + 2A√
N
⟨ξ(t)⟩ − 2β ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩ ( ⟨x(0)⟩ − ⟨x(t)⟩ − 2A√
N
⟨ξ(t)⟩ )
The noise term becomes negligible for large N , hence we can rewrite:
d ⟨δ(0)δ2(t)⟩
dt
= 2β ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩ − 2(α + β) ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩ (34)
Making use of the expression for ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩, Eqn. (40), derived below, we can rewrite Eqn. (34) as:
d ⟨δ(0)δ2(t)⟩
dt
= −2(α + β) ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩ + 2β2
α + β ⟨δ3(0)⟩ + 2αβα + β ⟨δ3(0)⟩ e−(α+β)t (35)
which has the closed-form solution:
⟨δ(0)δ2(t)⟩ = ⟨δ3(0)⟩(α + β)2 [β2 + 2αβe−(α+β)t + α2e−2(α+β)t] (36)
This can be generalized as follows:
⟨δ(0)δn(t)⟩ = ⟨δn+1(0)⟩(α + β)n [β + αe−(α+β)t]n (37)
17/22
P. Mavrodiev, F. Schweitzer:
The ambiguous role of social influence on the wisdom of crowds:
An analytic approach
Submitted for publication
C Derivation of ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩
We can use the same method applied in the previous section to expand:
d ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩
dt
= ⟨δ(t) d
dt
δ2(0)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=0
+δ2(0) d
dt
δ(t)⟩ = ⟨δ2(0) d
dt
(x(t) − ⟨x(t)⟩ )⟩
= ⟨δ2(0) d
dt
x(t)⟩ − ⟨δ2(0)⟩ d
dt
⟨x(t)⟩ (38)
Using the expressions for x(t) and ⟨x(t)⟩ from Eqs. (13), (14), we obtain:
d ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩
dt
= ⟨δ2(0)[α( ⟨x(t)⟩ − x(t)) + β(x(0) − x(t)) +Aξ(t)]⟩−
− ⟨δ2(0)⟩ [β( ⟨x(0)⟩ − ⟨x(t)⟩ ) + A√
N
⟨ξ(t)⟩ ]
= −α ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩ + β ⟨δ2(0)⟩ ( ⟨x(0)⟩ − ⟨x(t)⟩ ) + β ⟨δ3(0)⟩ − β ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩+
+D ⟨δ2(0)ξ(t)⟩ − β ⟨δ2(0)⟩ ( ⟨x(0)⟩ − ⟨x(t)⟩ ) − A√
N
⟨δ2(0)⟩ ⟨ξ(t)⟩
= β ⟨δ3(0)⟩ − (α + β) ⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩ (39)
where we have used that the expectations involving the noise terms are 0. The solution to this first-order
ODE is given by:
⟨δ2(0)δ(t)⟩ = β
α + β ⟨δ3(0)⟩ + αα + β ⟨δ3(0)⟩ e−(α+β)t (40)
Using the same line of arguments, we can obtain:
⟨δm(0)δn(t)⟩ = ⟨δm+n(0)⟩(α + β)n [β + αe−(α+β)t]n, m,n ≥ 0 (41)
which is a generalization of the previous Eqns. (30), (37), (41).
D Derivation of ⟨δ2(t)⟩
Eventually, we express:
d ⟨δ2(t)⟩
dt
= 2 ⟨δ(t)dδ(t)
dt
⟩ (42)
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Rewriting δ(t) from Eqn. (7), and using Eqs. (13), (14) for x(t) and ⟨x(t)⟩, respectively:
2 ⟨δ(t)dδ(t)
dt
⟩ = 2 ⟨δ(t)(dx(t)
dt
− d ⟨x(t)⟩
dt
)⟩
= 2 ⟨δ(t)⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝α(⟨x(t)⟩ − x(t)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=−δ(t) ) + β[x(0) − ⟨x(0)⟩´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=δ(0) + ⟨x(t)⟩ − x(t)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=−δ(t) ] +D (ξ(t) −
1√
N
⟨ξ(t)⟩)⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠⟩
= 2 ⟨δ(t)(−αδ(t) + β(δ(0) − δ(t)) +D (ξ(t) − 1√
N
⟨ξ(t)⟩))⟩
= 2β ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩ − 2(α + β) ⟨δ2(t)⟩ + 2 A√
N
⟨δ(t)ξ(t)⟩ − 2 A√
N
⟨ξ(t)⟩ ⟨δ(t)⟩ (43)
ξi(t) is Gaussian white noise, and we assume that it has a negligible influence on xi(t). This is a reasonable
assumption, because the major contribution to dxi(t)/dt comes from α and β, hence it is justified to
conclude that xi(t) and ξi(t) have a negligible covariance. Hence ⟨δ(t)ξ(t)⟩ − ⟨δ(t) ⟨ξ(t)⟩⟩ ≈ 0. Using this
we obtain:
d ⟨δ2(t)⟩
dt
= 2β ⟨δ(0)δ(t)⟩ − 2(α + β) ⟨δ2(t)⟩ (44)
Plugging in Eqn. (30), the closed form solution is given by:
⟨δ2(t)⟩ = β2 ⟨δ2(0)⟩(α + β)2 + 2Cβe−(α+β)tα + β +C1e−2(α+β)t (45)
where C1 is a constant obtained from ⟨δ2(t = 0)⟩ = ⟨δ2(0)⟩, and C is the constant from 29. Substituting
the constants yields:
⟨δ2(t)⟩ = [e−(α+β)tα + β]2 ⟨δ2(0)⟩(α + β)2 (46)
Again, this can be generalized to:
⟨δn(t)⟩ = ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n [β + αe−(α+β)t]n (47)
E Derivation of Eqn. (17)
We start from Eqn. (13), which can be rewritten as:
d lnxi(t)
dt
= α ⟨x(t)⟩
xi(t) − α + βxi(0)xi(t) − β + Aξi(t)xi(t) (48)
The ensemble average of Eqn. (48) is:
d ⟨lnx(t)⟩
dt
= α ⟨⟨x(t)⟩
xi(t) ⟩ − α + β ⟨xi(0)xi(t) ⟩ − β + A√N ⟨ ξi(t)xi(t)⟩ (49)
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xi(t) and xi(0) can be expressed by small deviations from their respective means, as written in Eqn. (7).
We further use a Taylor expansion around zero:
(1 + δ(t)⟨x(t)⟩)−1 = ∞∑n=0 (−1)n⟨x(t)⟩n ⟨δn(t)⟩ (50)
With this, Eqn.49 can be approximated as follows:
d ⟨lnx(t)⟩
dt
= α ⟨(1 + δ(t)⟨x(t)⟩)−1⟩ − α + β ⟨x(0)x(t) ⟩ − β + A√N ⟨ ξ(t)x(t)⟩
= α ⟨ ∞∑
n=0(− δ(t)⟨x(t)⟩)
n⟩ + β ⟨⟨x(0)⟩ (1 +
δ(0)⟨x(0)⟩)
⟨x(t)⟩ (1 + δ(t)⟨x(t)⟩)
⟩ − α − β + A√
N
⟨ ξ(t)
x(t)⟩
= α ⟨ ∞∑
n=0
(−1)n⟨x(t)⟩n ⟨δn(t)⟩⟩ + β ⟨x(0)⟩⟨x(t)⟩ ⟨(1 + δ(0)⟨x(0)⟩)(1 + δ(t)⟨x(t)⟩)
−1⟩
− α − β + A√
N
⟨ ξ(t)
x(t)⟩ =
= α ∞∑
n=0
(−1)n⟨x(t)⟩n ⟨δn(t)⟩ + β ⟨x(0)⟩⟨x(t)⟩ ⟨(1 + δ(0)⟨x(0)⟩) . ∞∑n=0 (−1)n⟨x(t)⟩n ⟨δn(t)⟩⟩−
− α − β + A√
N
⟨ ξ(t)
x(t)⟩
= α ∞∑
n=0
(−1)n⟨x(t)⟩n ⟨δn(t)⟩ + β ⟨x(0)⟩⟨x(t)⟩ [ ∞∑n=0 (−1)n⟨x(t)⟩n ⟨δn(t)⟩ + ∞∑n=0 (−1)n ⟨δ(0)δn(t)⟩⟨x(0)⟩ ⟨x(t)⟩n ]−
− α − β + A√
N
⟨ ξ(t)
x(t)⟩ (51)
We now express ⟨δn(t)⟩ by means of Eqn. (47) and ⟨δ(0)δn(t)⟩ by means of Eqn. (41). Further, we make
again the assumption that the random noise, ξi(t) is negligibly small and not correlated to xi(t). As a
consequence:
⟨ ξ(t)
x(t)⟩ = ⟨ξ(t)⟩⟨x(t)⟩ (52)
Hence, we obtain:
d ⟨lnx(t)⟩
dt
= (α + β) ∞∑
n=0
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n [β + αe−(α+β)t]n+
+ β ∞∑
n=0
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n+1 ⟨δ(0)
n+1⟩(α + β)n [β + αe−(α+β)t]n − (α + β) + A√N ⟨ξ(t)⟩⟨x(t)⟩ (53)
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where we have used that ⟨x(t)⟩ = ⟨x(0)⟩ for large t. We can transform the second term in the following
way:
β
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n+1 ⟨δ(0)
n+1⟩(α + β)n [β + αe−(α+β)t]n
= β(α + β)
β + αe−(α+β)t ∞∑n=0 (−1)n+1⟨x(0)⟩n+1 ⟨δ(0)
n+1⟩(α + β)n+1 [β + αe−(α+β)t]n+1
= β(α + β)
β + αe−(α+β)t ∞∑n=1 (−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n [β + αe−(α+β)t]n (54)
This leads to the dynamics finally written in Eqn. (17).
F Derivation of Eqn. (18)
Finally, we have to integrate the dynamics of Eqn. (17):
1
α + β ∫ d ⟨lnx(t)⟩dt dt = ∞∑n=1 (−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n ∫ [β + αe−(α+β)t]ndt´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶∶= A(n,t)
−
− β ∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n ∫ [β + αe−(α+β)t]n−1dt+
+ A⟨x(0)⟩√N ∫ t0 eβ(s−t) ⟨ξ(s)⟩ds (55)
The integral A(n, t) yields:
A(n, t) = βnt +C + n∑
k=1(nk)βn−kαk ∫ e−(α+β)tkdt =
= βnt +C − n∑
k=1(nk)βn−kαk [ 1(α + β)k e−(α+β)kt −C] == βnt +C [1 + (α + β)n − βn] − 1
α + β n∑k=1 1k(nk)βn−kαke−(α+β)kt (56)
Now we can write B(n, t) ∶= A(n, t) − βA(n − 1, t) and express the solution of Eqn. (55) as:
⟨lnx(t)⟩ = ∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n−1B(n, t) + A(α + β)⟨x(0)⟩√N ∫ t0 eβ(s−t) ⟨ξ(s)⟩ds (57)B(n, t) equals:
B(n, t) = βnt +C [1 + (α + β)n − βn] − 1
α + β n∑k=1 1k(nk)βn−kαke−(α+β)kt−
− βnt − βC [1 + (α + β)n−1 − βn−1] + β
α + β n−1∑k=1 1k(n − 1k )βn−1−kαke−(α+β)kt (58)
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Using the property of the binomial coefficient that (n
k
) = ( n
k−1) + (n−1k−1) we write further:
B(n, t) = C[1 − β + α(α + β)n−1] − αn
n(α + β)e−(α+β)nt − 1α + β n−1∑k=1 1k(n − 1k − 1)βn−kαke−(α+β)kt (59)
with
B(n,∞) = C[1 − β + α(α + β)n−1]
B(n,0) = C[1 − β + α(α + β)n−1] − αn
n(α + β) − 1α + β n−1∑k=1 1k(n − 1k − 1)βn−kαk (60)
The first term involves the integration constant, C, and can be determined from the initial condition⟨x(0)⟩:
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n−1⎛⎝C[1 − β + α(α + β)n−1]⎞⎠
= ⟨lnx(0)⟩ + ∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n αn ⟨δn(0)⟩n(α + β)n + ∞∑n=1 (−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n n−1∑k=1 1k(n − 1k − 1)βn−kαk (61)
where we have also zeroed the stochastic term, which is true for large N . Hence finally:
⟨lnx(t)⟩ = ⟨lnx(0)⟩ + ∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n αn ⟨δn(0)⟩n(α + β)n +
+ ∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δ(0)n⟩(α + β)n n−1∑k=1 1k(n − 1k − 1)βn−kαk −
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n αn ⟨δn(0)⟩n(α + β)n e−(α+β)nt
− ∞∑
n=1
(−1)n⟨x(0)⟩n ⟨δn(0)⟩(α + β)n n−1∑k=1 1k(n − 1k − 1)βn−kαke−(α+β)kt (62)
or more compactly as written in Eqn. (18).
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